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Abstract
Much of the order that exists in the inmate social system is not the
result of government action. How do prisoners create order? Inmates
use a combination of norms and organizations to provide governance
privately. Norms rely on decentralized information transmission and
enforcement mechanisms. Organizations, on the other hand, have
well-defined memberships and create explicit information transmis-
sion and enforcement mechanisms. Inmates cannot rely on norms for
governance when the inmate population is large, increasingly crowded,
and when fewer inmates arrive with a prior prison commitment. When
norms fail, inmates create organizations to protect themselves and pro-
vide governance. Once these groups have the power to deter preda-
tors, they prey on others. Contemporary and historical evidence from
California correctional facilities provide support for these claims and
suggest an explanation of the origin and growth of prison gangs.
∗Email: david.skarbek@duke.edu. Address: Duke University, Department of Political
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1 Governance in a Society of Captives
Prison gangs in California currently have a substantial influence within the
inmate social system, but they did not exist for the first one hundred years
that the corrections system operated. What led to their formation and rapid
growth in the late 1950s and 1960s? Prison gangs have reputations for vi-
olence and racism, and while this reputation is in some degree deserved,
it overlooks the important function prison gangs perform. This paper sug-
gests an explanation for the rise of prison gangs by examining inmates’ need
for extralegal governance in the inmate social system. Norms are effective
in relatively small communities because inmates can rely on decentralized,
reputation-based governance mechanisms at low cost. When norms fail, con-
flict increases, so inmates seek alternative forms of governance by creating
protective associations. Once these groups are powerful enough to deter
predators, they are also strong enough to prey on others—and they often do.
Prison gangs use their credible threat of violence to intimidate and extort
inmates and to engage in self-enforcing exchange in contraband markets.
Official institutions cannot provide all of the governance that inmates de-
mand. Correctional officers may be corrupt or face monitoring, prosecution,
and punishment costs that prevent them from maintaining a completely safe
facility, so inmates will victimize each other.1 Inmates cannot rely on official
mechanisms to support exchange in contraband markets, so they must devise
1Past work that models law enforcement actors as self-interested includes Benson et al.
(1995) and Mast et al. (2000).
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self-enforcing exchange institutions to capture the benefits of trade.
The emphasis of past work on norms has presented them as the alterna-
tive to government as a mechanism of social control (for example Ellickson
1989, 1991). This paper emphasizes a third option, organizations, as an im-
portant governance mechanism. People living in self-governing communities
can use norms and organizations to protect their property. Norms are ef-
fective in close-knit, homogenous groups. As a community becomes larger,
decentralized norms become less effective. Inmates seek alternative sources
of governance in the form of organizations. An organization is composed
of a well-defined group of members who develop explicit information trans-
mission and enforcement mechanisms. They have rules for how to interact
with others, and they threaten people who harm its members. The costs of
establishing an organization are justified when norms are insufficient to meet
the governance demands of inmates.2
This research contributes to three literatures. First, past work examines
self-governance and the private provision of local public goods in situations
where the state is absent to see what alternative governance institutions arise
(Ostrom 1990). Privately produced law and order can emerge in remarkably
diverse environments (Benson 1990; Benson 1998; Stringham 2007).3 These
2Becker (1968) is the first application of rational choice theory to crime and punishment.
Economists have modeled the relationship between deterrence and organized crime, find-
ing that greater deterrence can increase the competitiveness of criminal markets and the
amount of crime (Buchanan 1999). On the economics of organized crime more broadly, see
Anderson 1979; Reuter 1983, 1987; Jennings 1984; Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995; Garoupa
2000; Chang et al. 2005; Seals 2009.
3The effectiveness of self-governing groups has also been examined theoretically (Sutter
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institutions worked reasonably well in the context of mining camps (Umbeck
1977a; Umbeck 1977b; Umbeck 1981; Stewart 2009), the “wild” west (Clay
1997; Anderson and Hill 2002), international commerce (Benson 1989), Me-
dieval Japanese monasteries (Adolphson and Ramseyer 2009), international
Hawala networks (Schaeffer 2008), Ancient Greece (D’Amico 2010), and in
pre-colonial African trade (Leeson 2005, 2006, 2007b, 2008; 2009). The study
of prison gangs complements this work by investigating a society of captives
where the state has substantial control over people in a way that limits the
private provision of local public goods. For example, incarceration prevents
inmates from migrating to guide public good provision though Tiebout com-
petition (Tiebout 1956). Inmates cannot evict from the community those
individuals who free ride on local public goods, nor can inmates choose who
they live and interact with (Tullock 1985).
Second, past work examines how inmates develop governance institutions
to facilitate exchange. Radford’s (1945) classic article describes flourishing
markets in a World War II prisoner of war camp. Subsequent work inves-
tigates how social relationships among inmates influence market outcomes.
In P.O.W. camps during World War II, military hierarchy impeded markets
and led to lower survival rates than in camps with less hierarchy (Holderness
and Pontif 2009). In the infamous Andersonville Civil War camp, inmates
who had stronger social ties were more likely to survive because reciprocity
1995; Dixit 2004, Stringham and Zywicki 2011) and experimentally (Ostrom et al. 1992;
Powell and Wilson 2008; Smith et al. 2011). Powell and Stringham (2009) provide an
excellent recent survey of the literature on public choice and the economics of anarchy.
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within a social network smoothed resource shocks (Costa and Kahn 2007).4
The California corrections system provides an opportunity to compare the
effectiveness of governance institutions when the prisoners—criminals rather
than soldiers—are less likely to be cooperative.
Third, sociologists, economists, and political scientists have argued that
the distinguishing characteristic of organized crime is not that it engages
in crime, but that it governs crime by providing private protection services
to people engaged in illicit markets. The Sicilian Mafia (Gambetta 1993;
Bandiera 2003), Russian Mafia (Varese 2005), Japanese Yakuza (Milhaupt
and West 2000; Hill 2003), and Los Angeles gangs (Sobel and Osoba 2009;
Skarbek 2011) provide protection to people when the state cannot or will
not do so and a long-term demand for their services exists (Skaperdas 2001;
Varese 2011). Because of the lack of secure property rights, formal mar-
kets, and often subsistence levels of income, the inmate social system more
closely resembles a primitive society than a developed civil society (Costa and
Kahn 2007). Gangs operate like “primitive states” or “quasi-governments”
(Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1995; Baumol 1995). This paper examines the
role of organized prison gangs and governance institutions in light of coercion-
based theories of the origin of the state (Oppenheimer 1914; Holcombe 1993;
Benson 1999).
The history of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilita-
4Andersonville, however, was still subject to substantial amounts of violence and plun-
der at the hands of roving prisoner groups, suggesting the need for additional governance
institutions (Skarbek 2010b).
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tion (CDCR) provides the perspective needed to understand how governance
in the inmate social system relates to changes in the demographic and le-
gal environment. The state’s first facility opened in 1852, and it has the
second longest history of prison gang activity in the United States.5 Califor-
nia has been influential to corrections policy across the country (Irwin 1980)
and two recent Supreme Court rulings are intimately related with gangs,
so understanding California prison gangs informs inmate social organization
and public policy more broadly (Johnson v California 2005; Brown v Plata
2011).6
There are no reliable, publicly available quantitative data on prison gang
membership and activity within particular correctional facilities (Pyrooz et
al. 2011). The absence of data results from the consciously covert nature
of prison gangs and administrators’ desire to withhold sensitive information
related to operations (Fong and Buentello 1991). In fact, the CDCR with-
holds information precisely because it relates to gangs. For example, while
requesting data, the CDCR explained that they will not provide inmate eth-
nicity information at the institutional level “because of it’s sensitive nature
in relation to gangs and gang activity” (personal correspondence).
5On prison gangs in other states, see Jacobs (1977), Crist (1986), Lane (1989), Fong
(1990), and Fong and Buentello (1991). Camp and Camp (1985) provides the best national
survey of prison gangs available.
6Page (2011) provides an outstanding political history of incarceration in California,
with a focus on the political power of the California Correctional Peace Officers Associa-
tion. In general, the rising number of people incarcerated has important political implica-
tions, including reduced civic participation and trust in government (Weaver and Lerman
2010).
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To overcome this lack of data, this paper draws on two types of evidence.
First, excellent sociological and anthropological studies document inmate life
by researchers who either have been incarcerated (Chicano Pinto Research
Project 1970; Irwin 1980; Koehler 2000) or have conducted ethnographic
research inside prisons (Sykes [1958] 2007; Davidson 1974; Williams and
Fish 1974; Kalinich 1980). The accounts of former gang members, inmates,
and law enforcement officials provide insights into the origin, operation, and
development of prison gangs (Bunker 2000; Mendoza 2005; Morrill 2005;
Fuentes 2006; Morales 2008; Blatchford 2008). Second, the paper collects
data on inmate demographics from over sixty years of annual reports and
documentation from the CDCR. Much of these data are incomplete, but
by collecting them from archival sources and reports, they provide a clearer
picture of how changing demographic factors influenced inmate social orga-
nization. Though both of these data sources are less systematic than desired,
they have the advantage of providing an insider’s look at this issue, from mul-
tiple perspectives, and during the specific period of interest, so they provide
the best evidentiary sources available.
2 Theory and Empirical Implications
2.1 A Social Dilemma for Inmates
Inmates face numerous social dilemmas in their daily interactions, and the
rational behavior of each individual inmate may lead to a situation in which
7
everyone is worse off (Kollock 1998). Inmates can cooperate by either leaving
other inmates alone or engaging in mutually beneficial exchanges. Defection
occurs when inmates engage in physical, psychological, economic, and social
victimization, including rape, theft, assault, and opportunism when exchang-
ing contraband (Bowker 1980). Sykes’s classic study on prison life describes
the inmate’s choice to, on the one hand, “bind himself to his fellow captives
with ties of mutual aid, loyalty, affection, and respect, firmly standing in
opposition to the officials. On the other hand, he can enter into a war of
all against all in which he seeks his own advantage without reference to the
claims or needs of other prisoners” ([1958] 2007, 82). This suggests a Hobbe-
sian state of nature where the rules, norms, and shared strategies operating
within a facility determine whether inmates’ choices lead to lives that are
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
In indefinitely repeated games7 both inmates can theoretically establish a
self-enforcing equilibrium where both rationally choose to cooperate (Telser
1980), but several factors make this unlikely in the incarceration context.
First, many inmates have unambiguous release dates. Second, criminals
have high discount rates that make it more difficult for the shadow of fu-
ture benefits to sustain cooperation (Glaeser 1998, 3). People in noncriminal
contexts develop mechanisms to signal their low discount rate (Posner 2000,
7Indefinitely repeated games are not infinite but have no endpoint knowable ex ante,
and there exists an infinite number of possible equilibria. For further discussion, see Posner
(2000, 11-18), who models social interaction as a PD game with norms as an endogenous,
non-legal mechanism of cooperation.
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17), but since criminals discount the future heavily, they require alterna-
tive mechanisms (Gambetta 2009). Third, equilibrium choice in repeated
games often occurs by participants coordinating on focal strategies based on
shared cultural, historical, and social factors (Schelling 1960; Leeson et al.
2006). Under some conditions inmates will be able to coordinate on cooper-
ative strategies, but in others, defection will be focal because of the criminal
histories of the population.
The Hobbesian solution is for inmates to consent to the creation of a
sovereign to punish defectors (Hobbes [1651] 2009). Correctional officers lack
the necessary information and incentives to perform this role adequately. In-
mates often fake injuries and file false complaints to manipulate the system,
get time off prison jobs, move to a more preferred cellblock, and avoid other
inmates (Kaminski 2004, 145-168; Gambetta 2009, 111-148). A correctional
officer may also lack sufficient evidence to punish an assailant. When defec-
tion occurs during an illicit exchange, alerting a correctional officer will entail
confessing to one’s own participation in the prohibited activity. For exam-
ple, inmates cannot rely on guards to resolve a dispute over a heroin deal
gone wrong. In addition, supervisors cannot perfectly monitor correctional
officers, and guards may lack the concern needed to investigate a complaint
or punish the victimizer. Inmates can bribe officers to participate in illegal
activities, but when they do, they lose access to official governance mecha-
nisms and must rely on self-enforcing ones. In short, officials do not provide
all of the governance that inmates demand (Sykes [1958] 2007, 40-63).
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Inmates will attempt to produce their own governance mechanisms to
punish defection and facilitate cooperation.8 Norms and organization pro-
vide two methods for establishing self-governance within the inmate social
system. Norms identify the permitted, obliged, and forbidden behaviors of
people with particular attributes in a given context (Crawford and Ostrom
1995). Rather than reflecting an inherent belief or preference, norms are en-
dogenously determined in environments where people seek to maximize their
welfare compared with the efficiency of alternative mechanisms (Posner 2000,
11-35). Norms typify the relatively decentralized governance mechanism, and
they lack explicit protocols for communicating information and designated
individuals responsible for punishing defection.
Members of organizations, in contrast, form beliefs about the permitted,
obliged, and forbidden behaviors in a particular context, but they also have
a forum for discussing and establishing the range of available punishments,
assignment of the authority to punish, and protocols for imposing the pun-
ishment. An organization exists when a group with defined membership
develops explicit information transmission and enforcement mechanisms to
deter defection and punish it when it occurs.
Prison gangs are an important type of organization operating behind bars
and they have several methods of communicating information and punishing
misbehavior. Gangs communicate the standards of appropriate behavior
8The idea that institutions function as commitment devices and allows the capture of
gains from exchange is quite general. See North (1990),Ostrom (1990), Greif and Laitin
(2004), and Masten and Prufer (2011).
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explicitly in written documents. For example, the Nuestra Familia prison
gang outlines the fourteen principles of behavior for Hispanic inmates in its
document, the “Fourteen Bonds” (Fuentes 2006, 38-40, 63-65). Like most
prison gangs, the Nuestra Familia maintains a record of inmates, known as
the Bad News List, who deserve punishment for misbehavior (Fuentes 2006,
9). This list is distributed to gang leaders throughout the correctional system
who monitor for these individuals and punish them as appropriate. The gang
assigns specific members in each tier of a facility to the role of identifying
new inmates, checking them against the list, and monitoring and regulating
inmate behavior (ibid.). When an inmate in good standing with the gang
transfers to a different facility, he often brings a note from gang leaders to the
new facility to indicate his status at his previous location (Balassone 2010).9
Gang leaders often send additional notes separately.
These types of criminal information networks are not unique to Cali-
fornia prison gangs. The Soviet criminal fraternity vory-v-zakone (thieves-
with-a-code-of-honour) used similar mechanisms in the camps of the Gulag
Archipelago, particularly in Perm (Varese 2005, 123-144). The vory oper-
ated behind bars, had clearly defined-membership, induction rituals, codes
of behaviors, and mechanisms for adjudicating disputes (Varese 2005, 145-
166). A member’s standing was recognized when he was transferred to a
new facility, and communication processes aided the groups’ coordination of
9Correctional officials at San Quentin State Prison also reported to the author that
inmates use notes to provide information on other inmates and gang activity when trans-
ferring between locations.
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rule enforcement. For example, just as the Nuestra Familia has a Bad News
List to facilitate punishment, the vory have criminal courts that judge con-
flicts and decree punishments to other prison camps (Varese 2005, 157-159).
Like many California prison gangs, vory tattoos provide credible information
about an inmate’s gang membership, standing with the group, past crimes,
and acts of valor and courage conducted for the organization. By estab-
lishing a more centralized process that designates specific people to collect,
assess, and distribute information about inmates and specific people assigned
to punish unacceptable behavior, prison gangs provide an important organi-
zational alternative to norms.10
2.2 The Use of Norms and Organizations
Past research suggests empirical propositions about when norms will be less
effective. First, norms are less effective at governing large communities be-
cause there are more people interacting, more opportunities for defection,
and obtaining information about other people is more costly (North 1987;
Posner 2000, 16). Norms rely on decentralized governance mechanisms, and
they can be successful in small, close-knit communities. Rural neighbors in
Shasta County, for example, keep track of each other’s behaviors at low cost
(Ellickson 1991). However, the number of possible relationships and interac-
10It is important to note that both norms and organizations rely, in part, on violence to
create order. The difference is that norm-based governance is less robust to demographic
changes. Larger populations may also make organizations less effective if those new in-
mates are resistant to the previously accepted rules, or as was the case of the vory in
Russian prison camps, the influx of trained military personnel (Varese 2005).
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tions increases exponentially as communities grow, and this overwhelms the
decentralized information mechanisms used to monitor norm violations.
A second reason that norms are more effective in small communities is
that it is easier for people to overcome the collective action problem of pun-
ishment. Punishing a norm-violator is costly and has external benefits, so
people have an incentive to free ride in contributing to decentralized punish-
ment. People in larger communities face greater monitoring costs and each
individual’s contribution is less important, so free-riding on punishment of
norm-violations is more frequent.
Hypothesis 1 : Self-ordering communities cannot rely on norms
to provide governance in large populations.
Related, inmates have a greater demand for governance as resources become
more scarce. For a given capacity, a growing population increases the scarcity
of physical space and other resources. The increased value of resources re-
quires greater governance to secure property rights and prevent rent dissipa-
tion (Demsetz 1967; Anderson and Hill 2002). Norms can be effective when
inmates have ample living space and sufficient access to resources, but con-
flict increases when facilities become more crowded. These conflicts reflect a
need for more effective governance mechanisms.
Hypothesis 2 : Self-ordering communities cannot rely on norms
to provide governance when correctional facilities are becoming
overcrowded.
Norms are most effective in communities that are homogenous (Ostrom 1990,
13
166; Ellickson 1989, 1991, 167-183). In close-knit communities, people recog-
nize and respond to accepted norms, and their continued interactions allow
them the information and ability needed to exercise social control. Some self-
governing communities rely on religious homogeneity and low social distance
to encourage enforcement of norms, and establishing a corporate culture can
solve internal governance problems (Landa 1981; Bernstein 1992; Munger
2006; Leeson 2008; Kreps 1990).
In the inmate social system, new inmates must learn a complicated and
unusual set of norms that differs substantially from those operating in the
free society (Kaminski 2004). The Importation Hypothesis (Fleisher 1989,
131) argues that when inmates arrive, they import street-based norms into
the prison. However, empirical work finds that street norms often differ from
prison norms (Hunt et al. 1993). Some inmates will learn the norms quickly;
others may never fully grasp them. An inmate’s first prison commitment
will likely entail the greatest ignorance of the inmate norms. Cooperation
becomes less likely because new inmates’ ignorance leads them to misinter-
pret the signaling function of norms (Posner 2000, 18-27; Kaminski 2004).
An inmate who has already been to prison will be more likely to know and
follow the prison norms. Norms are less effective as the percentage of arriving
inmates who have served a past prison sentence declines.11
Hypothesis 3 : Reliance on norms will be less effective in self-
11This does not explain why prison gangs arise, as new inmates would also have to learn
the role that prison gangs play. However, more first-time inmates will make norms less
effective, giving rise to a need for alternative forms of governance.
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ordering communities when a greater proportion of arriving in-
mates have never served a prison sentence.
These three hypotheses predict when norms will be insufficient to meet in-
mates’ demand for governance. A related empirical implication is that when
norms fail, there will be an increase in inmate conflict. This conflict will lead
inmates to seek alternatives methods of providing governance.12
When norms fail to secure property rights, people will seek new ways to
limit access to resources and to secure rents (Anderson and Hill 2002). In
the illicit context, criminal organizations form specifically to secure property
rights over illicit rents (Leeson and Rogers 2011). In prison, the failure of
norms leads inmates to seek alternative solutions in the form of organizations.
Hypothesis 4 : If norms fail to provide the governance needed in
a self-ordering community, then inmates will create organizations
to provide governance.
If the inmate social system more closely resembles a primitive society than a
developed civil society (Costa and Kahn 2007) and gangs can be understood
as quasi-governments or primitive states (Baumol 1995; Skaperdas and Sy-
ropoulos 1995), then the literature on the origins of the state is relevant for
understanding governance in the inmate social system. Benson (1999) argues
for a coercion-based theory of the state arising from hunter-gatherer commu-
nities. Anthropological and historical evidence show that primitive societies
12The ineffectiveness of norms does not imply that inmates will have no norms what-
soever or that they will play an unimportant role in the inmate social system. Rather,
just as inmates cannot rely solely on official mechanisms of social control, these changing
demographics mean that they also cannot rely on norms.
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develop mechanisms of cooperation to facilitate order within groups. How-
ever, as some groups develop a comparative advantage in violence, they will
begin to plunder others. The result is that “while cooperation dominates
within primitive groupsintergroup conflict appears to be a ubiquitous char-
acteristic of human history” (Benson 1999, 135).13
The state develops from these organizations. Throughout history the
“formation of states came from a tightly knit and ruthless group of exces-
sively violent people who conquered, levied tribute, and if circumstances
permitted, established their authority over the territory and its population”
(Volkov 2002, 712-713; see also Lane [1942] 1966, 1958). Oppenheimer (1914)
argues that the state “is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of
men on a defeated group” whose “basic justification, its raison d’tre, was
and is the economic exploitation of the subjugated (Oppenheimer 1914, 15,
20). Carneiro (1970) explains that “force, and not enlightened self-interest,
is the mechanism by which political evolution has led, step by step, from
autonomous villages to the state.” The defining characteristic of govern-
ment is as an “organization that has the ability to finance its activities by
compulsory contributions from all individuals in a given geographic area”
(Holcombe 1993, 86). Extraction of tribute in exchange for “protection”
is especially effective in contexts like prison where exit is costly (Holcombe
1993, 89).
13See Bates et al. (2002) on the role of organized violence, property rights, and the state
in primitive societies.
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It is not inevitable or necessary that powerful groups become predatory.
Internal motivations, such as moral or normative principles, can constrain
predation (Stringham 2011). Non-group members may lack sufficiently valu-
able resources to warrant monopolizing the provision of protection services
and appropriating resources (Dourado 2011). The very act of predation might
make group members’ less safe because the victims’ response endangers their
security. Members might be harmed in the predation process. Alternatively,
preying on others can lead victims to invest in technologies of violence that
make them a threat. Predation can lead other non-affiliated groups to join
together, and thereby present a new risk to the safety of group members.
In some cases, a group will constrain its predatory actions in the present to
increase the total tribute it can extract over time (Skarbek 2011).
Research on state formation suggests these constraining influences were
not sufficiently strong in primitive societies, so powerful groups preyed on
others. In the absence of constraining influences behind bars, inmate protec-
tive associations will evolve into predatory quasi-states.14
Hypothesis 5 : Powerful inmate organizations will extract re-
sources from other inmates.
To summarize, inmates rely on norms to provide extralegal governance ser-
vices behind bars. However, norms become ineffective at solving social dilem-
mas when the inmate population is large, overcrowded, and populated by a
14These do not meet Holcombe’s (1993) definition of a state because they lack the ability
to force contributions from all member of the community.
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greater proportion of first-time inmates. Inmate conflicts increase because
norms provide less governance than inmates demand. Inmates seek alterna-
tive sources of governance in the form of organizations with clearly defined
membership and explicit information transmission and punishment mecha-
nisms. Once these groups form and have a credible threat of violence, they
will have an incentive to prey on other inmates and will have a comparative
advantage in contraband markets.
3 Extralegal Governance in the California Cor-
rectional System
3.1 Norms Previously Worked Well
Prison gangs currently have a substantial influence within the inmate social
system, but they have not always existed (Blatchford 2009). There is no
evidence of organized prison gang activity inside California facilities prior
to the 1950s, and during that period, decentralized norms were the impor-
tant governance mechanism within the inmate social system (Irwin 1980).
During the 1960s and 1970s, this changed dramatically as ethnically based
prison gangs rose to prominence (Camp and Camp 1985, 92-116; California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 2010, 372).
Until the 1950s and 1960s, a set of norms known as the convict code
constrained inmate behavior (Irwin 1980, p. 13). It established a status
18
ranking based on one’s conformity with its behavioral prescriptions, which
forbid informing on others, showing weakness, cooperating with staff, and
victimizing most other inmates (Irwin 1980, 12; see also Sykes [1958] 2007;
Irwin and Cressey 1962; Williams and Fish 1974, 17-99; Carroll 1974; Bunker
2000, 118; Koehler 2000). The more closely an inmate followed the convict
code, the higher his status among other inmates. For example, an inmate
who was known to snitch to correctional officers would be verbally accosted,
ostracized, or physically assaulted. His deviation from the accepted behavior
reduces his status in the community, restricts his access to resources, and
makes him vulnerable to victimization.15 Inmates incarcerated for sexual
offenses, like rape or child molestation, are often attacked because many in-
mates feel that only weak people commit crimes against women and children.
As a result, inmates who assault sexual offenders gain status in the inmate
hierarchy. The esteem afforded by inmates to those who conform to the code
limited inmate-on-inmate victimization. By generating a consensus about
acceptable behavior and signaling one’s cooperativeness when exchanging
contraband, the inmate norms also provided the “legal environment of the
sub rosa system” (Williams and Fish 1974, 53, also 41-2).
Informal groups aided the resolution of inmate conflicts (Irwin 1980, 58-
60). These groups lacked a formal structure and well-defined membership,
and they were mainly “extended social networks or crowds that were loosely
15Recent research incorporates esteem (Brennan and Pettit 2004) and the role of internal
moral constraints (Stringham 2011) into economics.
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held together by shared subcultural orientations or preprison acquaintances”
(Irwin 1980, 58). These groups were overlapping and interconnected (Irwin
1980, 58; Bunker 2000, 112).
Writing in the 1990s, Irwin explains, “there is no longer a single, over-
arching convict culture” (Irwin [1970] 1990, vi; see also Hunt et al. 1993).
By 1974, norms were no longer the most prominent governance mechanism
in prison, and violent inmates “who, in the pursuit of loot, sex, respect, or
revenge, will attack any outsider have completely unraveled any remnants of
the old codes of honorviolence-oriented groups dominate many, if not most,
large men’s prisons” (Irwin 1980, 192; also Hunt et al. 1993; Blatchford
2009). The inmate social system changed dramatically during the period, as
norms became ineffective from roughly 1950 to 1970.
3.2 The Decline of Norms
The first hypothesis predicts that norms will be ineffective at providing gov-
ernance in large communities. The earliest period of notable increase in
the inmate population took place from 1944 to 1969. The year-end inmate
population grew from 5,710 to 27,535 inmates, increasing nearly five times
(Figure 1). In its one hundred year history, the corrections system had never
before experienced a population increase this large. Consistent with the first
hypothesis, there was a substantially larger inmate population during the
period that norms became ineffective. This period also corresponds with the
years when prison gangs first formed-1956, 1966, 1967, and 1968 (California
20
Figure 1: Total Year-End California Inmate Population, 1851-2009
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 2010, 372).16
The second hypothesis suggests that norms will provide an insufficient amount
of governance in the inmate social system when there is greater scarcity of
resources. An increasing number of inmates increases demand for resources.
This requires greater governance to secure property rights. This occurs when
the inmate population grows faster and when it exceeds the design capacity
of the facility.
The inmate population was increasing at the specific facilities where
16The lack of quantitative data on prison gang membership at the institution-level makes
systematic analysis difficult, but anecdotal evidence of minimal gang activity in rural,
county jails where populations are smaller is consistent with this theory.
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prison gangs formed. The first California prison gang formed in 1956 at
the Deuel Vocational Institution (a prison in Tracy, CA). The inmate popu-
lation had increased 7 percent in the last year, and in that year, the facility
first exceeded its designed capacity. From 1949 to 1963, the only years where
institution-level data are available, the population at Deuel Vocational In-
stitution increased by 321 percent. From 1959 to 1961, CDCR transferred
the first prison gang members from the Deuel Vocational Institution to San
Quentin Prison. The population at San Quentin increased during this period
to a total 5,424 inmates-more than a thousand new inmates within two years.
The CDCR system exceeded capacity in fourteen years, between 1949 and
1970, averaging 111% overcrowding for the period. In 1974, San Quentin had
the highest density of inmates per one hundred square foot of buildings and
grounds of all CDCR facilities, 16.21 compared with a mean and median
for all facilities of 6.94 and 4.55 (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation 1975, 20). Overcrowding first became a serious issue in the
four years prior to the first prison gang’s formation. According to the 1952
annual report on prisons, “there is a 30 percent overcrowding in the male
institutions of the Department. Actually, the capacity of the institutions in
terms of permanent buildings takes care of only one-half of the present resi-
dent population” (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
1953, 3). Overcrowding persisted, and in 1954 the CDCR reported that it has
“faced the tremendous problem of reorganizing the California prison system
to provide additional housing facilities to care for this increased population”
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(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 1955, 11).
Physical space became more scarce as the inmate population grew and
exceeded the physical design capacity of correctional facilities. The increased
value of resources-including the number of inmates per cells, physical space
on tier blocks, cafeterias, and recreation yards and the availability of show-
ers, toilets, and basketball courts-required greater governance to secure their
property rights.17
Consistent with the first two hypotheses, the period during which the
convict code was in decline corresponds with both an unprecedented increase
in the size of the inmate population and severe overcrowding.
The third hypothesis suggests that norms will be less effective when a
greater proportion of arriving inmates have never served a prison sentence.
It takes time and effort for new inmates to learn the norms governing the
inmate social system, so an increase in the percentage of first time inmates
will increase the relative cost of using norms. Without knowledge of the
norms, new inmates misinterpret and disregard signaling mechanisms and
disrupt the social system more frequently. When punishing defection requires
coordinated activity, the decline in consensus caused by the influx of new
inmates reduces the effectiveness of governance through norms.
17A recent Supreme Court ruling finds that overcrowding in California correctional fa-
cilities entails “serious constitutional violations.” The decision argues that overcrowding
leads to severe shortages in medical and mental health care for inmates, increases the
incidence of infectious disease, and creates “violent, unsanitary, and chaotic conditions,”
leading to more inmate lockdowns, longer wait times for medical care, and less safety
(Brown v. Plata et al., No. 09-1233 [Sup. Ct. May 23, 2011]).
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During the 1950s and 1960s, the system received an increasing number
of young offenders who either did not know or adopt the norms dictated
by the convict code (Irwin 1980, 189). Interviews with felony offenders with
long criminal histories in California found that older inmates perceived young
inmates to be more disruptive, and they attributed the change in the inmate
social system to the behavior of new inmates (Hunt et al. 1993). There was
a divergence in the norms of young and old inmates. The study finds that
young inmates show “little or no respect of the older inmates, many of whom
had long histories of prison life which normally would have provided them
with a high degree of status” (405). New inmates “had not been socialized
into the convict culture. The dominance of these groups soon led to an
environment where the rules and codes of behavior were no longer adhered
to” (406).
Data collected from CDCR records provide evidence from 1945-1984 on
the percentage of arriving inmates with no prior prison commitment (Figure
2). Consistent with the third hypothesis, the percentage of inmates with a
prior prison commitment fell from 36.5 percent to 25 percent throughout the
period that norms were declining in importance.
The respondents in Hunt et al. (1993) suggest two reasons for why prison
norms are different today. One is that inmates enter prison with norms that
differ from the convict code, for example, by not respecting inmates who have
served long sentences. A second observation is that young inmates are more
disruptive in the inmate social system. Consistent with the respondents’
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observations, the percentage of arriving inmates aged 25 years or younger
increased from 26.7 percent in 1950 to 40 percent in 1970. Similarly, inmates
aged younger than 20 years old increased from 2 percent to 5.4 percent of
newly arriving inmates. A CDCR study on prison stabbings from 1960 to
1975 found that younger inmates are more likely to be a “stabber,” and
the study attributes this finding to the fact that “younger inmates are less
experienced in dealing with the pressures of prison life because they are
less likely to have served a prior prison sentence” (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation 1975, 67, xiv). Norms became less effective
at the same time that more inmates arrived who were young and who had
never served a prison sentence.
Qualitative research identifies the period from the mid-1950s to the 1970s
as marking the decline of the effectiveness of norms for governing the inmate
social system. The demographic data on the size of the inmate popula-
tion, the growth rate of the population, the designed capacity of the institu-
tions, and the proportion of newly arriving inmates who had never served a
prison sentence are consistent with theoretical reasons for the ineffectiveness
of norms. If the evidence showed that the inmate population was small or
falling, overcrowding was less problematic, or more inmates arrived with a
prior prison commitment, then we could reject either at least one of these
hypotheses or their combined explanatory power.
As norms were becoming less effective, the inmate social system expe-
rienced more conflict. The 1960s saw a rise in inmate-on-inmate assaults.
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Figure 2: Percent of Arriving Inmates with a Prior Prison Commitment,
1945-1984
Corrections officials conducted a study on the causes of inmate stabbings be-
cause “prisons in the State of California have experienced increased violence
by prisoners” since the early 1960s (California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation 1975, iii). They found that the number of inmate stab-
bings increased six times between 1960 and 1973. The study found that
“larger prison populations strongly correlate with increased prison violence”
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 1975, xii, 51-52).
Crowding was the second most important factor explaining inmate stabbings
at the institution level, and “increased building and ground area (sq. ft.)
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within the security area strongly correlates with reduced prison violence”
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 1975, xii, also 51-
52). This evidence is consistent with the argument that demographic changes
made norms less effective and led to more inmate conflict.
4 Prison Gangs as Protective Associations
In the face of increasing inmate conflict, inmates sought alternative gov-
ernance institutions. The fourth hypothesis suggests that the inability for
decentralized norms to effectively provide governance will lead inmates to
form organizations to do so (Leeson and Rogers 2011).18 To mediate con-
flict in the face of changing inmate demographics, inmates created protective
associations-prison gangs-to serve this need.
Forming in 1956, the Mexican Mafia is the first California prison gang
(Camp and Camp 1985, 20; Pyrooz et al. 2011).19 The gang developed to
protect Hispanic inmates from predatory white inmates and to reduce conflict
among rival Hispanic street gangs (Mendoza 2005). The Mexican Mafia
started in the Deuel Vocational Institution after “several Latino inmates
18An inmate will also benefit more from creating a protective association the longer his
sentence is. This is consistent with the findings that prison gangs initially formed in state
prisons, rather than county jails.
19This paper focuses on California, but the relationship between norms and organiza-
tions is likely to apply in other prisons. For example, to the extent that European prisons
are less overcrowded, have fewer inmates, and have more liberal drug laws that prevent
large numbers of drug users from entering the system, prison gangs should be less preva-
lent. While this seems to be true, there is no systematic research on gangs in jails and
prisons in Europe, outside of the UK (Pyrooz et al. 2011).
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organized a protection group and dedicated themselves and their resources
to equal and fair treatment for Mexican-American inmates” (Fuentes 2006,
xv-xvi; see also Blatchford 2008, 5; Morales 2008, 55; Davidson 1974, 81). By
grouping together, these inmates generated a credible threat of violence and
protected themselves from other predatory inmates. Hispanic inmates “gave
up their street gang identity for the collective purposes of mutual protection,
to run illicit businesses in the prison, and to gain power over other inmates”
(Camp and Camp 1985, 93).
By 1961, the CDCR transferred many of these inmates to San Quentin
Prison, where older and physically larger inmates confronted and threatened
them (Blatchford 2008, 5). The group recruited new members, established
a more formal organization, and retaliated against inmates who victimized
them. The Mexican Mafia quickly established a reputation for their effective
use of violence (Mendoza 2005, 17-18; Blatchford 2008, 4-11). According
to a former member of the gang, from 1957 to 1959, the founding members
began “establishing their reputation of terror” (Mendoza 2005, 16). The
gang recruited members who were brave and willing to use violence. Within
a few years of informally grouping together, these inmates formally created
the Mexican Mafia. They agreed on a set of rules for how members should
behave and how to conduct collective decision-making.20
Consistent with Hypothesis Five, once the Mexican Mafia had a credible
20For more on the internal organization of prison gangs, see Skarbek (2010a), Leeson
and Skarbek (2010), and Skarbek (2011).
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threat of violence to protect its members, they could also credibly threaten
to harm other inmates. Mexican Mafia members “began robbing inmates
of their possessions-prison ducats, canteen goods, and drugs-while making
examples of those that would dare oppose their demands” (Mendoza 2005,
16). They intimidated, threatened, and assaulted other inmates (Mendoza
2005, 22). Unaffiliated inmates had “to surrender their prison luxuries and
items of comfort such as wrist watches, rings, shoes and anything that could
either be enjoyed by [the Mexican Mafia] or sold on the prison black market”
(Mendoza 2005, 22-23).
These “attacks aroused and consolidated a large number of ‘independent’
Chicanos, who planned to eliminate the [Mexican] Mafia members” (Irwin
1980, 190; also Morales 2008, 20-3, 56-8). Hispanics from the rural regions
of northern California “formed their own alliance for self-protection” (Camp
and Camp 1985, 93). These Hispanic inmates formed the Nuestra Familia
prison gang (Porter 1982, 10; Camp and Camp 1985, 92-101; Morales 2008,
7). The Nuestra Familia prison gang’s earliest written constitution outlines
their intentions and internal organization, explaining that the “primary pur-
pose and goals of this O[rganization] is for the betterment of its members
and the building up of this O[rganization] on the outside into a strong and
self-supporting familia” (Fuentes 2006, 5 emphasis in original). A federal in-
dictment explains that NF “provided protection and security for its members
and associates from rival organizations and gangs both inside and outside
California correctional institutions” (United States v Rubalcaba et al. 2001,
29
2). Studying the Nuestra Familia in Colorado, former inmate and anthropol-
ogist Robert Koehler explains that the gang acts as a mutual aid society and
“provides Familianos [members] with physical protection from rival gangs
and supplies them with store goods at low cost or on low credit, and Fa-
milia serves as their emotional family” (Koehler 2000, 174). Consistent with
the fourth and fifth hypotheses, as the need for governance increased, prison
gangs protected its own members and then preyed on others.21
It may be that more people that are violent were incarcerated, and violent
inmates formed prison gangs to engage in violence. From 1950 to 1970, the
percentage of inmates arriving for a violent offense did increase from 51
percent to 63 percent. According to a CDCR study, “high concentrations
of inmates with violent commitment offenses were the strongest influence on
stabbings” at the institution level (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation 1975, 53). However, when they studied who actually becomes
a “stabber,” they found that being incarcerated for a violent commitment
offense was not statistically significant, and the study determined it was
the “least important” out of twelve variables in explaining who becomes a
stabber (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 1975, 67).
Gang membership is the second most important factor (ibid.). These findings
suggest that prison gangs arise in dangerous contexts because of a need for
21The evidence is also inconsistent with the alternative explanation that street gang
members simply imported their organizational structure into the correctional system and
formed prison gangs. Street gangs existed for thirty to forty years before prison gangs
formed (Moore 1991, 26) and many of the original founders of prison gangs were not
street gang members (Fuentes 2006, xvii; Chicano Pinto Research Project 1970, 81).
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protection, rather than simply that violent people use gangs as a vehicle for
violence.
Protection is a common reason given for why prison gangs form. In 1985,
the Department of Justice conducted a national study on prison gangs by sur-
veying prison administrators. They found that the prison gangs’ “purposes
range from mutual caretaking of members to large profit-making criminal
enterprises” (Camp and Camp 1985, 1). A veteran correctional officer in
California writes, “most gangs in prison originally started out as protection
groups” (Morales 2008, 6). A correctional officer at Corcoran State Prison
explains, “When you come to prison, you have to join a gang. You have
no choice. It’s a must. . . Because you have no protection. You’re on your
own. And anything can happen to you.” (MSNBC 2010). One prison gang
member explains that the gang “controlled the [main population area] there
by offering protection of numbers, protection of comradeship” (Porter 1982,
14).
In addition, extorting, exploiting, and endangering other inmates appears
to be a general feature of prison gang activity. Camp and Camp (1985) asked
prison administrators about nineteen different criminal acts that a prison
gang might be involved in. They reported that five of the six most frequently
reported criminal acts “demonstrate power over and abuse of weaker persons
within the prison” (Camp and Camp 1985, 45). Their relationship with non-
gang members in business frequently “translates into taking advantage of
them. The gang’s aim is to control other inmates” (Camp and Camp 1985,
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43).
5 Prison Gangs Control Contraband Markets
Once established, prison gangs like the Mexican Mafia and the Nuestra Fa-
milia could protect its members from victimization. The increasing inmate
population and the growing demand for narcotics behind bars increased mar-
ket opportunities, so prison gangs expanded their scope of control to govern-
ing illicit contraband markets. They had a comparative advantage in illicit
trade because they had credible punishment mechanisms to use in case of
defection.22
According to CDCR regulations (California Code of Regulations, Section
3006), inmates can only purchase a limited range of goods, and of course,
these do not include items such as heroin and alcohol. As a result, most of the
inmate economy operates in contraband markets. These markets provide an
important source of economic goods to “virtually all prisoners” (Irwin 1980,
206-212; also Williams and Fish 1974) and are the basis of the informal
inmate social system (Kalinich and Stojkovic 1985).
Although contraband markets operated prior to the formation of prison
gangs, the increasing number of people incarcerated during this period meant
the potential for market exchange had expanded. Since the 1960s, illicit
inmate economic activity “has become much more complex and extensive and
22Criminal organizations rely on a variety of internal governance mechanisms to affect
collective action (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000; Leeson 2007a; Gambetta 2009; Leeson 2010).
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interlaced with the clique and gang activity. By and large, when the violent
cliques and gangs dominate the prison, they control most of the large-scale
sub rosa economic systems” (Irwin 1980, 206). Individual proprietors, who
lacked protection from a prison gang, were unable to participate in large-
scale business, and they were frequently threatened and robbed (Irwin 1980,
211-2). Prison gangs currently control the inmate contraband markets in
CDCR facilities (Morales 2008).
Soon after prison gangs formed, President Nixon increased the scale and
scope of the drug war with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970. This corresponded with an increase in the percentage of
inmates addicted to narcotics and the number sentenced for narcotics-related
offenses. CDCR annual reports have data on arriving inmates’ narcotics ad-
dictions (including marijuana) from 1959 to 1980. The percentage of inmates
addicted to narcotics entering the system from the courts each year increased
from 27 percent in 1959 to 73.4 percent in 1980 (Figure 3). The annual flow
of inmates arriving from the courts who lacked a narcotics addiction declined
from 3,936 in 1959 to 2,826 in 1980.
The flow of new inmates who were sentenced for narcotics-related crimes
increased as well (Figure 4). In 1950, only 168 inmates arrived to serve
sentences for narcotics-related crimes, but by 2000, this number regularly
surpassed 10,000 per year. These inmates had greater knowledge of narcotics
and had connections with which they could continue their business behind
bars. At the same time, the rise of street gangs in the illicit drug market
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Figure 3: Narcotics Addictions of Arriving Inmates, 1959-1980
meant that ready-made organizations existed to facilitate the trafficking and
importation of drugs into the prison system (Blatchford 2009).23
23The rise of street gangs does not diminish the role of prison gangs. First, the Mexican
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Figure 4: Inmates Arriving For Narcotics Offenses, 1950-2009
By 1964, the Mexican Mafia had control of “San Quentin’s narcotics
trafficking as well as gambling, loansharking and other black market activities
inside the prison walls” (Mendoza 2005, 20). A Nuestra Familia gang member
describes their rival’s prominence in contraband markets, noting that the
Mexican Mafia was “in charge of every drug transaction and prison pleasure”
(Fuentes 2006, xvii).
At San Quentin, the Mexican Mafia “virtually controls the illegal eco-
Mafia formed, in part, to mediate conflict between street gangs. Second, it is rare that
enough members of a particular street gang are housed in the same correctional unit
to effectively protect themselves and control the illicit trade. For example, the average
Hispanic street gang in Los Angeles has 52 members. It is unlikely that enough of them
will be housed in one of the state’s thirty-three facilities to operate effectively as a prison
gang. An incentive remains to organize a perennial, prison-based group.
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nomic activities” (Davidson 1974, 96). They can govern economic exchanges
and credibly threaten to punish defection. The prison gang
has an unquestioned stability because it has the power and means
to collect and pay legitimate debts from one prison to another
(or even on the streets). . . This makes dealing with [the Mexican
Mafia] a very positive, secure, yet serious matter. For example,
[the Mexican Mafia] will collect or pay a legitimate debt, regard-
less of where the debtor or debtee might be transferred—even if
he is released to the streets. In contrast, if a prisoner has finan-
cial dealings with an inmate, there is the constant threat that
the inmate will be transferred to a different prison (or even be
paroled or charged to the streets)—which would present serious
difficulties in tendering payment or collecting a debt (Davidson
1974, pp. 96-97; emphasis in original).
The threat of violence-which prison gangs originally developed for protection-
induces cooperative behavior with inmate consumers:
Anyone who consciously deals with [the Mexican Mafia] knows
the seriousness with which members regard [the Mexican Mafia]
activities and the extent to which they will go to protect [the
Mexican Mafia]. Non-[Mexican Mafia] individuals who function
on the lower levels of the prisoner culture understand the rules
of the game, and even the extreme act of death to a snitch may
seem justifiable to them. The mere possession of this knowledge
usually is sufficient to keep prisoners from crossing [the Mexican
Mafia] in any way. . . Members [of the Mexican Mafia] know very
well that their group could never survive without such severe
protective measures (Davidson 1974, p. 97).
The prison gang “gained both a monopoly over most major sources of contra-
band goods and an ability to control the price of many goods and services,”
and as a result, they have become “the financial institution of the prisoner
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economy” (Davidson 1974, 119; see also 118-125).
Officials confirm that the Mexican Mafia ran the drug trade in San Quentin
and Folsom prisons in the early 1980s (Porter 1982, 18). Some evidence sug-
gests that the Mexican Mafia’s role in the inmate economy improved market
opportunities more broadly. The prison gang “increased the routine volume
of goods available for all prisoners, making more goods available at lower
prices than would be otherwise” (Davidson 1974, 124), and “the conditions
of many Chicanos and convicts has been significantly improved. Many Chi-
canos claim that they are in a better position than any other group inside
prison” (83).
Gangs continue to operate actively in contraband markets throughout
California’s correctional facilities. In fact, prison gangs’ prominent role in
drug trafficking behind bars is an important reason for correctional officials’
attempts to disrupt them (Hunt et al. 1993, 400). Koehler explains that “the
basis of Familia is capitalism. . . economic ventures allow Familia to counter
the perceived hegemony of the guards/prison system and the threat of rival
prison gangs” (2000, 170-171). A national survey of prison administrators
finds that drug trafficking is the second most frequent criminal activity en-
gaged in by prison gangs, and prison gangs are responsible for the majority of
drug trafficking (Camp and Camp 1985, 44-5, 52-3). Administrators report,
“almost without exception. . . the gangs are responsible for the majority of
drug trafficking in their institutions” (Camp and Camp 1985, 52).
While it is clear that prison gangs prey on some inmates, they also engage
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in contractual and productive activities. Camp and Camp (1985, 45) asked
prison administrators to identify how often prison gangs engage in nineteen
different criminal acts. Respondents’ answers range from Very Frequent (5
points) to Very Seldom (1 point). The higher the rating score, the more
frequently prison administrators believe prison gangs engage in that action.
According to the survey, prison gangs engage in predatory actions often, in-
cluding intimidation (148 points, the highest score), assault (134), abuse of
weak inmates (133), extortion (131), theft (117), strong arm robbery (99),
robbery (89), rape (83), murder (79), arson (61), and slavery (52). On the
other hand, prison gangs also engage in activities that gang members and
other inmates likely view as contractual and productive (even though ad-
ministrators view them as crimes). These actions include distributing drugs
(145, the second highest score), protection (131), and arranging prostitution
services (88) and sodomy for sale (83).
The remaining four criminal actions in the survey are ambiguous. “Rack-
ets” scores 96, but it is unclear if this refers to predatory or productive ac-
tions; this could include, for example, extortion or illicit bootlegging of prison
wine (pruno). Prison gangs often commit crimes associated with “Contra-
band Weapons” (128), but the nature of this offense is not obvious. Inmates
could use weapons either to prey on others or to provide protection. Simi-
larly, it is unclear whether “explosives” (which rates the lowest, 47) entails
predatory or productive activities, from an inmate’s perspective. “Bribery”
scores 71, an action that could assist gangs in supplying inmates with con-
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traband or help conceal inmate intimidation.
The amount of points assigned to predatory and productive activities
provides a rough measure of the nature of prison gang activity. Predatory
activities consist of 58.6 percent of all activities; productive activities account
for 23.4 percent. These data are imperfect for two reasons. First, they are
based on the perspective of the administrators rather than the inmates, and
administrators may have a biased sample. Voluntary drug exchanges, for
example, are less likely to be observed than murder or assault. Second, these
reflect the frequency that gangs engage in a behavior, not how important
those behaviors are to the inmate social system. Murder receives a relatively
low score, but an instance of murder is certainly more important than one of
theft, which is engaged in more frequently.
6 Conclusion
The inmate social system responds to the constraints created by incarcera-
tion and the demographics of its population. Prison gangs engage in violence,
but their actions are not arbitrary or irrational. People in the inmate social
system previously relied on decentralized norms to limit conflict and pro-
vide governance. These norms became insufficient as the inmate population
quintupled in size, exceeded design capacity, and more first-time inmates
entered the system. With unmet demand for governance, inmates turned
to alternative solutions and formed protective associations. Members of the
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Mexican Mafia and Nuestra Familia established hierarchical organizations
with effective information transmission and enforcement mechanisms. Once
these groups could effectively deter predators, they used their organizations
to participate in contraband markets. In the 1970s, an increasing number
of inmates with narcotics addictions entered the system, and prison gangs
provided the credible threat of violence that deterred opportunistic behavior
in self-enforcing exchange.
This paper suggests several implications for the origin and development
of inmate governance mechanisms and the role of norms and organization.
Whereas past research on norms has focused on peaceful communities, in-
cluding in rural neighborhoods (Ellickson 1991) and among professional di-
amond traders (Bernstein 1992), this paper provides evidence that norms
become less effective in large populations, even in contexts where violence
is a possible means of supporting norm-based governance. Second, creating
governance mechanisms does not require a high-level of wealth within a com-
munity. Outside finance to create governance institutions is not a necessary
condition for their provision. Third, groups that facilitate communication
through organizations can increase cooperation, but the use of violence that
induces cooperation carries a cost (Ostrom et al. 1992). Creating governance
mechanisms is always costly, but there are substantial rewards to finding
lower cost ways of doing so. Given the context of incarceration and inmate
demographics, prison gangs appear to be the efficient providers of governance
in the inmate social system.
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While this paper has provided an argument for why prison gangs exist,
this does not imply that it is a first-best solution to the problem of order in the
inmate social system. Prison gangs do provide protection to some inmates,
but they formed because of the failure of state-created institutions that were
supposed to protect inmates. Gangs are the central players responsible for
flourishing contraband markets. They increase wealth by responding to (il-
licit) market prices to provide inmates with goods and services that people
voluntarily demand. According to prison administrators (Camp and Camp
1985), the productive activities of prison gangs constitute an important part
of their activities. However, they also steal, assault, and intimidate many
inmates who cannot opt-out of interactions with them. Prison gangs engage
in predatory behavior nearly twice as often as productive activities (Camp
and Camp 1985).
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